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Increasingly, the process of redrawing congressional and state legislative boundaries to 
achieve the “one person, one vote” goal has been marked by partisan maneuvering, lack of 
civility, and litigious strategies. This paper provides an overview of redistricting 
procedures, discusses lessons learned from the post-2010 decennial census round of 
redistricting, and offers recommendations for improving cooperation between the political 
parties during the post-2020 Census redistricting cycle. It offers pathways for promoting 
fair and equitable political representation. 
 




“One person, one vote” represents a prime building block of American democracy.1 
Population equality provides the cornerstone for fair representation in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, state legislatures and local legislative bodies across the nation2.  After 
each decennial census, legislative district boundaries are redrawn to take into account the 
new population data.  
 
In the United States, redistricting is governed by certain constitutional and statutory 
provisions and is subject to judicial review. According to court rulings, Article 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution requires that congressional districts adhere to the “one person, one vote” 
principle that all districts are nearly equal in population as is practicable. Pursuant to the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment equal population standards apply to all 
legislative districts, but the standards for acceptable population deviation ranges are 
stricter for congressional districts than for other legislative districts. The federal Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (as amended) prohibits vote dilution in redistricting plans when 
significant racially polarized voting is evident.  State constitutional and state laws also amy 
apply to aspects of redistricting. 
 
B. Suspect Practices 
 
Fair and equal political representation long has been undermined by efforts to manipulate 
district boundaries to advantage a particular group or party.  For example, in early 19th 
century England, “rotten boroughs” (also called “pocket boroughs”) were a common 
feature of electoral districts.3  Such a borough, though it lost population, maintained its 
boundaries and thereby received a greater share of political representation than it 
merited.4  In the United States, redistricting to provide a group with an advantage also has a 
 
1  See Reynolds	v.	Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) 
2  U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 2 and 14th Amendment 
3  See Encyclopedia Britannica Editors, “Rotten Borough,” Encyclopedia Britannica, available at 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/rotten-borough 
4  See id. 
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long history; it has popularly been referred to as “gerrymandering,” after a legislative 
district plan that Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry approved.5   
 
In recent decades with the use of computer-based tools, “gerrymandering” has become 
more and more sophisticated.6 By manipulating minority populations or political party 
strength, a line drawing party disregards aggregate vote totals a party receives statewide 
and draws districts that maximize its share of winnable districts and improve its electoral 
chances to control a legislative chamber for an entire decade.  
 
For example, under the guise of drawing “majority minority” districts to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act, several state legislatures have resorted to “packing” practices.  “Packing” 
occurs when line drawers concentrate a group of voters in a district to reduce their voting 
strength elsewhere. Packing often leads to charges of constitutional violations, particularly 
of the 14th Amendment’s right to equal protection. 
 
In contrast, “cracking,” another questionable practice, allows the line drawer to disperse 
voters of a particular demographic group over several districts, diluting the voting power 
that group could exercise in a single district.  Cracking may lead to charges of violations of 
Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (as amended).  Specifically, under certain 
circumstances such practice may violate Section 2’s requirement against diluting minority 
voting strength. 
 
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Thornburg	v.	Gingles7 decision set the standard for 
determining Section 2 Voting Rights Act violations after North Carolina’s practice of using 
multi-member districts was rejected for diluting minority voting strength. In Thornburg, 
North Carolina’s original plan divided “politically cohesive groups of black voters” into 
districts where blocks of white voters would consistently defeat minority supported 
candidates. This violated the Voting Rights Act by preventing black voters from being able 
“to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.”8 
 
The Supreme Court’s standard for determining Voting Rights Act violations includes a 
three-part test.  To establish a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs must 
prove: 1) that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to 
constitute a majority in a single-member district; 2) that the minority group is politically 
cohesive and usually votes for the same candidates; and 3) that, in the absence of special 




5 See Brian Duignan, “Gerrymandering,” Encyclopedia Britannica, available at 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/gerrymandering 
6 For information on a computerized redistricting tool, see “Maptitude for Redistricting Software,” Caliper, available at 
https://www.caliper.com/mtredist.htm   




Once plaintiffs establish the three preconditions, they proceed to establish a Section 2 
violation by “the totality of the circumstances.” To do so entails showing that the members 
of the minority group had “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice.”10 
The Thornburg decision arguably sparked more Republican attempts to draw as many 
minority districts as possible, regardless of their shapes. As the Republicans drew more 
and more districts benefitting minority communities, neighboring white neighborhoods 
became less diversified and more conservative, helping to elect more Republican 
candidates. 
 
The Republican National Committee capitalized on this strategy beginning the 1990s, 
convincing even then-Democratic majority state legislatures in states requiring Section 5 
Voting Rights Act approval to create new minority districts that also leveraged new 
Republican opportunities elsewhere.  A former Justice Department official commented, “if 
you can draw a majority-minority district, even if it’s bizarre in shape, you’re going to have 
to justify your failure not to draw that district,” adding “we were not concerned about the 
political ramifications. If it helped Republicans, so be it. Our job was to help blacks and 
Latinos get elected.”11 
 
C. Promoting Comity 
 
According to New York University Law School Professor Richard Pildes, “Legislators of 
both parties currently think anything goes if they have enough political power to ram a 
plan down the throat of the party out of power. “12 
 
A lack of comity in redistricting can be seen not only in state legislatures, but also in 
county-driven local redistricting.  Perhaps the poster child for politics at its worst was the 
Madison County (IL) Board post-2000 census redistricting process.13 Upon review of that 
board’s deliberations, a federal court wrote, “[T]he process in Madison County was 
characterized by threats, coercion, bullying, and a skewed view of the law.” 14 
 
Calls for procedures to ensure fairer and more transparent redistricting are not new but 
are gaining traction.  In his 2016 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama 
called for an “end [to] the practice of drawing our congressional districts so that politicians 
can pick their voters and not the other way around.”15  
 
10 52 U.S.C. 10301 
11 See Ari Berman, “Give Us The Ballot,” Farrar, Straus & Giraux, 189 (2015) 
12 Richard Pildes, “High-stakes gerrymandering cases at Supreme Court draw wide NYU Law involvement” (March 20, 
2019), available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/partisan-gerrymandering-supreme-court 
13 Hulme v. Madison County, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Ill. 2001)	
14 Id. at 1041 
15 Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address,” The White House (January 24, 




Increasingly there are calls for the establishment of commissions to take on the task of 
redistricting.16  In 2014, voters in New York State approved a constitutional amendment 
creating a new advisory commission to redraw congressional and state legislative districts 
for the legislature’s consideration. The New York amendment was a bipartisan product, 
drafted by a Democratic Governor, Democratic Assembly and Republican Senate. Recently, 
commissions have been created in Ohio, Missouri, Colorado, Michigan and Utah.  In 
Virginia, a commission may draw congressional and state legislative lines if that state’s 
legislature and voters approve a plan in 2020. 17 The Ohio and Virginia proposals for 
commissions were drafted with bipartisan legislative cooperation, while the Missouri, 
Colorado and Utah commissions were developed through the referendum process.  
 
A commission is not the only pathway to fairer redistricting.  There also are model 
practices that promote comity and fairness that leave the redistricting process in the 
control of state legislatures.18 Commission and non-commission pathways will be discussed 
below in sections V and VI. 
 
II. National Political Party Redistricting Efforts 
 
A. Republican Party Efforts 
 
Both major national political parties assist states with redistricting. Since the 1980s, the 
Republican Party has provided legal and technical assistance through the Republican 
National Committee.19  Most recently, Republicans provided redistricting assistance 
through the Redistricting Majority Party (referred to as “REDMAP”) project.20 The post-
2010 census REDMAP plan reportedly sought to gain or retain control of as many state 
legislatures as possible so that Republican would control the redistricting process for 
congressional and state legislative district lines through the 2020 elections. Nationally 
Republicans spent millions of dollars for efforts related to redistricting and litigation.  
 
Author David Daley 21 provides a detailed review of post-2010 census redistricting 
processes in several states with strong Republican state legislative majorities (Florida, 
Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin). While Democrats also drew 
 
16 AP, “Number of states using redistricting commissions growing,” Philadelphia Inquirer (March 21, 2019),	available	at 
https://www.inquirer.com/politics/nation/number-of-states-using-redistricting-commissions-growing-20190321.html 
17  See Graham Moomaw, “General Assembly approves independent redistricting commission, despite objections from 




18 See Caroline Cournoyer, “Can Redistricting Ever Be Fair?,” Governing (November 2011), available at 
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/can-redistricting-ever-be-fair.html  
19 See Michael Wines, “Thomas Hofeller, Republican Master of Political Maps, Dies at 75,” New York Times (August 18, 
2018), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/obituaries/thomas-hofeller-republican-master-of-political-
maps-dies-at-75.html  
20 See David Daley, “Ratf**ked: The True Story Behind The Secret Plan to Seal America’s Democracy,”,W.W. Norton & 
Company, at xiii  (2016). 
21 See David Daley, “Ratf**ked: The True Story Behind The Secret Plan to Seal America’s Democracy,” W.W. Norton & 
Company (2016) 
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maps to strengthen their own majorities through the post-2010 census redistricting cycle, 
Republicans’ efforts were considered more robust than those either party had made before. 
 
B. Democratic Party Efforts 
 
On the Democratic Party side, legislators have been assisted on redistricting by the 
Democratic Legislative Leaders Association (merged into the Democratic Legislative 
Campaign Committee in 1995), Democratic National Committee, IMPAC 2000 (for Members 
of Congress) and, for the 2010 cycle, the Foundation For The Future.  After 2010, 
particularly compared with Republican investments, the national Democratic Party 
resources earmarked for redistricting were limited largely to providing mapping assistance 
and legal strategy to Democratic state legislative leaderships. After the  2016 elections, 
former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder created the “National Democratic Redistricting 
Committee” in an effort to help elect more Democratic state legislative majorities and 
impact the post-2020 redistricting process. 
 
Seeking advantages on redistricting were not the sole province of Republicans in the post-
2010 Census round.  Democrats controlled the redistricting process in Illinois after the 
2010 elections and arguably “diluted” rather than “packed” opposing party voters. The 
Illinois plan weakened Republican-leaning districts by placing parts of Republican-leaning 
suburbs into Chicago’s Democratic strongholds.  
 
In Maryland, Democrats who were in the majority in the state legislature redrew one 
Republican-held congressional district, by extending it from far western Maryland 
considerably eastward into the Washington, D.C. suburbs.  That made it far less likely that a 
Republican could win that seat. The Maryland congressional plan was challenged in federal 
court as a partisan gerrymander that sought to eliminate the state’s only Republican 
member of Congress. In 2019, the Maryland case was dismissed after the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in a separate case22 that federal courts could not decide partisan 
gerrymandering challenges.23 
 




Observers attribute the Republicans’ 2012 Pennsylvania congressional delegation edge to 
advantages in the post 2010 Census redistricting plan.  That plan arguably had been drawn 
by Republicans to “pack” as many Democratic voters into as few districts as possible. 
 
Daley recounts efforts that then Pennsylvania State Senate Majority Leader Dominic Pileggi 
(R) made in support of separate proposals to distribute the state’s electoral college votes:  
the first, according to the congressional districts won by presidential candidates; the 
 
22 Lamone v. Benisek, 588 U.S. ____ (2019)  
23 Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. ____ (2019) 
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second, on the candidate’s share of the popular vote. Pileggi thereafter lost his Senate 
leadership post , reportedly because his Republican colleagues considered him “too 
moderate.”24 
 
In League	of	Women	Voters	of	Pennsylvania	v.	Commonwealth	of	Pennsylvania, plaintiffs 
challenged Pennsylvania’s 2011 congressional map as an illegal partisan gerrymander 
under the state’s constitution. In a January 2018 decision, the Pennsylvania State Supreme 
Court agreed with plaintiffs and prevented the state from using the plan in the 2018 
elections.25 After the legislature failed to enact a new map of its own, the state court drew a 
redistricting plan.26 
Republican Pennsylvania state legislators and Republican members of the state’s 
congressional delegation asked a three-judge federal panel to step in to prevent the state 
court map from going into effect.27 After the three-judge panel dismissed the Republican 
lawmakers’ challenge, the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently rejected a motion to prevent 
the new map from being used.28  
 
The State Supreme Court’s map was used in the November 2018 election; in that election 
Democrats picked up three Pennsylvania congressional seats, resulting in an equal split 
between Republicans and Democrats in the state’s U.S. House delegation membership.29. 
 
B. Ohio 
In Ohio, the state legislature was responsible for redrawing the state’s congressional 
districts in 2011. Based on his review, Daley concluded that U.S. House Speaker John 
Boehner (R) had an indirect but powerful role in determining how the new Ohio 
congressional district map would be drawn. Daley cites conversations between an 
operative for U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) and Ohio 
legislative staff asking the Ohio state legislature to enact a new plan that would be 
“virtually unchanged from before” because it was important to “[s]omeone important to us 
all.”30  
 
24 See Daley, supra note 21, at 31 
25 Common Cause et al v. Commonwealth, No. 159 MM 2017 
 
26 League of Women Voters et al v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the Middle District 
(February 19, 2018), available at http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/PA%20lwv%2020180219%20remedy.pdf 
27 Steve Esack, “Republican lawmakers file new suit over Pennsylvania’s congressional, Morning Call (June 21,2018), 
available at https://www.mcall.com/news/pennsylvania/mc-nws-pennsylvania-congress-map-lawsuit-20180621-
story.html (“‘Still, we believe the voters of Pennsylvania deserve an answer as to whether the state Supreme Court 
overstepped its authority,’ [Senate Leader Joe Scarnati and House Speaker Mike Turzai] ‘We believe it did.’”) 
28 See Brennan Center for Justice, “League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” (October 
29, 2018) available at https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/league-women-voters-pennsylvania-v-
commonwealth-pennsylvania (summarizing the Order entered by Justice Alito on February 5, 2018)  
29 See “United States House of Representatives elections in Pennsylvania, 2018,” Ballotpedia, available at 
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Pennsylvania,_2018 
30 See Daley, supra note 21, at 84 
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According to Ohio politics writer Steve Hoffman “all restraints went by the boards after the 
2010 census” in Ohio, with Republicans creating as many partisan advantages in the state 
as possible. Ohio Republicans ran their redistricting process behind closed doors through 
the Ohio Campaign for Accountable Redistricting. There was little attempt at transparency. 
A room called the “Bunker” was rented at a local Columbus hotel for three months in order 
to draft redistricting plans far from public view. Maps were kept secret for as long as 
possible.31  
According to Daley, Democratic Representative Kathleen Clyde made numerous, albeit 
unsuccessful, attempts to involve herself in a meaningful way in the redistricting process. 
As the representative of the House Democratic leader, she called the redistricting process a 
“sham.”32 
By referendum in 2015, Ohio voters approved a constitutional amendment submitted by 
the General Assembly that added two new members of the minority party to the state’s 
legislative Apportionment Board that to draw the state legislature’s districts.  The revised 
board is tasked with drawing maps that favor neither major political party and follow voter 
preferences.33  In 2018, voters approved another amendment, this time to require 
sufficient bipartisan support for state legislative adoption of a ten-year congressional 
redistricting map, providing for commission development of a bipartisan plan if the first 
option failed, and setting procedures for the state legislature to create a four-year 
redistricting plan should the initial state legislative and commission processes fall short.34  
The procedures delineated in the respective constitutional amendments are to be used in 
drawing districts for the 2021 elections. 
C. North Carolina 
 
North Carolina’s redistricting process has been the subject of prolonged litigation over 
several decades. From the post-1990 redistricting process through 2001, North Carolina’s 
Democratic state legislative leadership defended its plans before the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
the 1993, Shaw	v.	Reno	decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that several minority district 
 
31 See Daley, supra note 21, at 88 
32  Daley, supra note 21,  at 94 (quotes Clyde saying that she “sat in on this traveling summer committee where they took 
apportionment board on the road so we could show the map to the people, But we didn’t have the maps! We went on the 
road and we didn’t have anything to show. So we didn’t get very good attendance, and they use that as proof that people 
don’t care. Of course, they’re during the day, they’re not very well publicized- and we don’t have any maps. I traveled 
around the state and saw nothing, just frustration and discouragement from the people who had the wherewithal to find 
out about it and come. They do that on purpose, too. Chaos, confusion, trying to make government look incompetent. It’s a 
very cynical approach designed to keep people from having faith in their government and wanting to participate in the 
electoral process.”) 
33 https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Bipartisan_Redistricting_Commission_Amendment,_Issue_1_(2015) 
34 See Laura A. Bischoff, “From guns to marijuana: How Ohio’s laws changed this year,” Dayton Daily News (December 31, 








shapes were so bizarre as to suggest that voters were being separated into different 
districts based on race and race alone in violation of the U.S. Constitution.35 The Court sent 
the case back to the federal trial court to determine whether the state plan was justified by 
a compelling government interest that was not race-based36. In 2001 in Easley	v	
Cromartie37, the Supreme Court upheld a redrawn map on the basis that redistricting for 
political reasons did not violate federal laws banning race-based line drawing.38 The Court 
determined that African Americans tended to favor Democratic candidates and that the 
revised districts were based on behavioral patterns reflecting those voters’ political 
preferences, not on their race. 
 
In the post-2010 census redistricting cycle, partisan and race-based factors continued to be 
at issue in the state. According to Daley, post-2010 North Carolina congressional district 
lines followed a national design to “segregate African American voters in three districts and 
concede those districts to the Democrats.”39 North Carolina’s post-2010 census district 
maps had been drawn by the late Republican expert Tom Hofeller, one of the most 
experienced redistricting technicians in the nation and an architect of the Trump 
Administration’s failed attempt to add a citizenship question to the 2020 decennial census 
questionnaires to further Republican Party purposes.40   
 
After the 2010 redistricting round, North Carolina’s congressional and state legislative 
redistricting plans were challenged several times in state and federal courts.41 A federal 
district court found that the First and Twelfth congressional districts were racially 
gerrymandered.42   Those congressional district lines were redrawn by the legislature after 
a 2016 court order  and used in the 2018 election cycle.43 
 
 
35  509 U.S. 630 (1993) In Shaw, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote that one district’s lines were “alleged to be so bizarre 
on its face that it is ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race’…We believe reapportionment is one area in which 
appearances do matter.” She commented that the 12th congressional district that followed an interstate highway that 
joined cities with heavy minority populations together to meet population requirements “bears an uncomfortable 
resemblance to political apartheid.” Id. At 647 
 
36 34 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. N.C. 1998) 
37  532 U.S. 234 (2001)  
38  532 U.S. 234 (2001) 
39 Daley, supra note 21, at 50 
40	See	Will Duran, “Who leaked the Hofeller files?,” Raleigh News & Observer (September 23, 2019). See also Michael 
Wines, “The Battle Over The files Of A Gerrymandering Mastermind,” New York Times (September 5, 2019), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/us/gerrymander-north-carolina-hofeller.html (in 2019, files discovered on 
Hofeller’s personal computer hard drive revealed his role in helping to develop the Commerce Department’s reasoning for 
including a citizenship question in the 2020 census.  
  
41 See Michael Wines and Richard Fausset, North Carolina Is Ordered To Redraw Its Gerrymandered Redistricting Map. 
Again,“ New York Times (August 27, 2018), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/us/north-carolina-
congressional-districts.html 
42 Wines, supra note 40 
43 Wines, supra note 40 
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In 2019 in Rucho	v.	Common	Cause, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed partisan 
gerrymandering challenges to North Carolina’s congressional map, ruling that such 
challenges were not subject to federal court review.44 
 
In September 2019 in Common	Cause	et	al	v.	Lewis	et	al, a North Carolina trial court found  
that North Carolina’s state legislative plan violated the state’s constitution by denying 
voters the right to fair and free elections. This was the first post-Rucho state court ruling to 
hold that a partisan gerrymander to state legislative districts was impermissible.45 
 
IV. Promising Practices for Fair Redistricting:  California and Massachusetts 
 
A. California Moves to Non-Partisan Commission 
 
Traditionally, California redistricting conducted by the state legislature was marked by 
partisanship.46  Alleged overreaching gave rise to early calls for an outside commission to 
handle redistricting.  After the 2000 decennial census, Democrats and Republicans 
successfully avoided redistricting litigation by forging legislative compromise plans.  
Nonetheless, the perception that redistricting was too partisan in California remained, 
prompting voters in November 2008 to approve Proposition 11, which created an 
independent commission for redistricting state legislative lines.  In 2010 voters passed 
Proposition 20 that added congressional redistricting to that commission’s portfolio.  
 
The California Citizens Redistricting Commission is charged with redrawing state 
legislative, congressional and Board of Equalization district lines. Members are chosen 
through a multilayered application process administered by the State Auditor. Applicants 
must submit essays and letters of recommendation and undergo background investigations 
and interviews.  Over 30,000 California residents submitted applications in 2010 to serve 
on the redistricting commission.47 The commissioner selection process limits the state’s 
legislative leaders’ in the commission to the opportunity to strike up to twenty-four 
commission candidates.  From a final pool of thirty-six applicants, eight randomly selected 
commissioners select six additional commissioners from among the remaining applicants. 
Thereafter, the original eight commissioners, who are provided with training on the state’s 
demographics and geography and on the use of redistricting software, conduct the initial 
commission meetings.48  
 
 
44  588 U.S.__(2019) 
 
45 Common Cause v Lewis et al, 18-CVS-014001 Superior Court, Wake County  (September 4, 2019),  
46 See Wallace Turner, “California G.O.P. Seeks To Void Redistricting,” New York Times (September 22, 1981), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/09/22/us/california-gop-seeks-to-void-redistricting.html; see also Dan Walters, 
“California Democrats don’t like gerrymandering? But they were so good at it,” Mercury News (October 8, 2017), available 
at https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/10/08/walters-california-democrats-dont-like-gerrymandering-but-they-
were-so-good-at-it/ 
47 See California Citizens Redistricting Commission, “Background on Commission,” available at 
https://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission/ 
 
48 See id.	(the initial and subsequent meetings are public).	 
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California’s first commission included five Republicans, five Democrats, and four 
individuals not affiliated with the Democratic or Republican parties but who either were 
registered with another party or declined to state a party preference.  The Commission was 
tasked with following strict, nonpartisan rules designed to create districts of equal 
population in order to provide fair representation.49 
 
The California Commission provides a model other jurisdictions may choose to follow. It is 
tasked with holding public hearings and accepting public comment before plans can be 
considered.  Commission decisions require nine affirmative votes from Commission 
members; of those affirmative votes, at least three must come from commission members 
registered with the state’s two largest political parties and at least three must come from 
other commission members.50 
 
B. Massachusetts State Legislature Produces Plan Avoided Any Legal Challenges  
 
The post-2010 redistricting process in Massachusetts offers lessons on how legislatures 
can improve the chances of enacting redistricting plans with appropriate transparency, 
inclusiveness and objectivity.  
 
After the 2000 decennial census, Massachusetts’ two legislative chambers worked on 
redistricting through separate Senate and House efforts. The Massachusetts State Senate 
redistricting plan became law and was never challenged in court. In contrast, a federal 
court rejected the Massachusetts House districting plan because it violated the federal 
Voting Rights Act by failing to properly create minority districts in the Boston area.51  
 
In 2009, in preparation for the post-2010 decennial census redistricting cycle, both 
Massachusetts state legislative chambers partnered to create a special Joint Committee on 
Redistricting for congressional, state legislative and Governor’s Council districts. 
 
The post-2010 committee was chaired by Democrats Senator Stan Rosenberg (who had 
chaired the post-2000 process) and Representative Michael Moran. Working together with 
a committee of seven state senators and nineteen state representatives, the joint 
committee held thirteen public hearings across the state that drew more than 4,000 
residents. In total, over 400 people testified at the hearings, offered testimony and/or met 
with legislators. A dedicated website with video recordings, maps, data and other relevant 
information, drew 35,000 visits.   The Chairs’ report summarized the entire redistricting 
process.52 
 
49 About “We Draw The Lines” at https://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission/ 
 
50 See	id.  
  
51 Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, No. 02-11190 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2004) 
 
52 Senator Stanley Rosenberg and Representative Michael J. Moran, “Report from the Chairs of the Special Joint 





The committee sought to comply with constitutional and legal requirements and to balance 
competing redistricting principles.  The latter considerations included population equality, 
equal electoral opportunity, compactness, contiguity, preservation of county and municipal 
boundaries and communities of interest. The population size of senate and house districts 
had to change to accommodate population shifts and changes. In congressional 
reapportionment, the state lost one congressional district,53  
 
Voting Rights Act concerns also were relevant. Compliance with Section 2 of the federal 
Voting Rights Act may make compactness and preservation of political subdivision lines 
difficult. State constitutional limits prohibiting the splitting of towns can conflict with 
population equality requirements. Population shifts within localities might run contrary to 
limits on redrawing election precincts before redistricting is completed.  Nonetheless, the 
committee plan created twenty effective minority House districts, up from ten in the 2000 
plan. In the Senate, for the first time in Massachusetts a third effective minority district was 
created (in Western Massachusetts).  In the congressional plan, an effective minority 
district with a fifty-six percent minority population was created. 
 
A movement to create an independent redistricting commission in Massachusetts failed to 
generate enough support by legislators to gain traction. 54Nonetheless, the senate 
committee’s post-2010 process makes a strong argument that legislative redistricting left 
to state legislators can result in new lines drawn fairly and without giving rise to prolonged 
litigation. Not a single legal challenge was filed against any of the Massachusetts’ 
redistricting plans after they went into effect in 2011. 
 
According to Rosenberg, “Creating legislative districts at both the federal and state levels of 
government have historically been a significant responsibility of state legislatures. In the 
face of the recent trend to take this job away from state legislators by creating so-called 
independent commissions, as Senate Chair of Redistricting in Massachusetts in  2002 and 
20012, I believed we in the legislature had to redouble our efforts to create constitutionally 
defensible maps. We worked with a broadly representative process. We respected 
traditional and ever evolving redistricting principles and enhanced transparency. As a 
result, none of the maps created by the Senate in 2002 and none of those created by the 
House and Senate in 2012 were challenged in court. These maps were widely embraced 
and endorsed by the public, the media, organized interest groups and the political 
community, validating the ability of legislatures to fulfill this fundamental responsibility.“55  
 
Massachusetts is the only state legislature that created a permanent redistricting 
committee after its post-2010 plans were enacted.  The Massachusetts Redistricting 
Committee had considered ways to improve redistricting.  Going forward, such 
considerations will likely relate to drawing election precinct level lines and determining 
 
53 See	id.  
 
54 See Massachusetts Common Cause, “Fair Districts,” available at https://bit.ly/2kyqJba  
55 Comments from Rosenberg provided to the author (January 25, 2019) 
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whether to count prisoners at their home-of-record prior to incarceration rather than in 
their place of incarceration.56 
 
V. 2018 Reform Initiatives   
 
In November 2018, voters adopted redistricting reform initiatives in four more states:  
Colorado, Michigan, Missouri and Utah.  
A. Colorado (Amendment Y & Amendment Z)  
By referenda in November 2018 Colorado voters approved two state constitutional 
amendments: Amendment Y creates a commission to redistrict congressional seats; 
Amendment Z creates a commission for redistricting state legislative seats.57  
Under both referenda, three retired appellate judges—one from each major party and one 
unaffiliated—are to select commissioners from a pool of applicants. Democrats, 
Republicans, and independents each have four members on the commission. Two votes 
from each bloc are necessary to enact a map. Each of the state’s legislative leaders can 
select up to ten applicants for random selection.  
Maps must adhere to criteria including: compliance with federal law; preserving defined 
communities of interest; keeping cities and counties whole; maximizing compactness; 
maximizing the number of politically competitive districts; banning the intentional favoring 
or disfavoring of a party or candidate; and preventing the dilution of the electoral strength 
of voters belonging to a racial or ethnic minority. 
Nonpartisan legislative staff assist the commission and prepare preliminary maps; the state 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the maps. If a commission fails to pass a map, 
commission staff would submit their last developed plan to the court for review. 
B. Michigan (Proposal 2)  
By referendum in 2018 Michigan voters approved Proposal 2, which creates an 
independent redistricting commission for congressional and state legislative 
redistricting.58 The proposal establishes a 13-member commission, to be comprised of four 
Democrats, four Republicans, and five non-major-party members. The secretary of state 
solicits and reviews applications from those seeking to serve on the commission and 
prepare demographically and geographically representative random samples of 30 
applicants from each party and 40 from unaffiliated applicants. The four legislative leaders 
can remove five applicants from each pool but not select members. The secretary of state 
makes the final selections on a random basis.  
 
56 Senator Stanley Rosenberg and Representative Michael J. Moran, supra, at 15-18 
57  See Ballotpedia, “Colorado Amendment Z”, available at https://bit.ly/33tVG13  
58 See Michigan Proposal 2, available at https://bit.ly/2pHsi5E  
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In order to adopt a plan at least two commissioners from each group must agree to the 
map. Proposals must meet select criteria, including compliance with the Voting Rights Act; 
geographic contiguity; preserving communities of interest; partisan fairness; not favoring 
or disfavoring a particular candidate or incumbent; keeping counties, cities, and townships 
whole; and compactness. 
C. Missouri (Amendment 1)  
By referendum in 2018, Missouri voters approved the "Clean Missouri" Amendment that 
requires the state auditor to develop a pool of applicants from which a nonpartisan 
demographer is selected.59 The demographer is to develop maps subject to the 
commission’s approval, based on an "efficiency gap" to gauge partisan fairness.60 The 
“efficiency gap” test was used in a Wisconsin case to demonstrate partisan imbalance.   
That case, Gil	v.	Whitford,	currently is on remand in federal district court in Wisconsin. 
Pursuant to Missouri’s amendments, maps must attempt to treat both major political 
parties fairly so that the party winning the most votes statewide also wins the most 
legislative seats. While the current maps were drawn by a bipartisan commission after 
2010, the GOP has maintained a districting advantage for the past twenty years. 
D. Utah (Proposition 4)  
By referendum in 2018, Utah voters approved Proposition 4,61 which creates a seven-
member redistricting commission; legislative leaders from both parties each select three 
members and the governor appoints a seventh member to serve as chair. While the 
majority party effectively can appoint four members (as long as that party controls the 
Governor’s office), redistricting maps for congressional and state legislative districts 
require the vote of at least one of the minority party appointees to prevail. 
The proposition delineated criteria the state courts could enforce. Ranked criteria include: 
following federal law; minimizing the number of divided municipalities; minimizing the 
number of divided counties; promoting compactness; ensuring transportation connections 
exist within districts; preserving neighborhoods and communities of interest; following 
natural geography; and nesting districts so that state Senate and state House borders 
overlap as much as possible. The criteria also prohibit intentionally favoring or disfavoring 
any particular party or candidate. 
The state legislature could still pass its own map if it disapproves the commission’s plan, 
but the legislatively drawn map would be subject to the same criteria as the commission’s.   
VI. Post-2018 Redistricting Activity  
 
59 See Ballotpedia, “Missouri Amendment 1, Lobbying, Campaign Finance and Redistricting Initiative (2018),” available at 
https://bit.ly/2M9hdY7  
60 id 
61 Ballotpedia, “Utah Proposition 4,Independent Advisory Commission on Redistricting Initiative (2018),” 
available at https://bit.ly/35EdZTp  
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A. Powers and Authority 
 
As a result of electoral changes in November 2018, several state legislatures considered 
making legislative changes to redistricting procedures before partisan power was to shift 
in January 2019. 
 
In the wake of the November 2018 elections, Republican state lawmakers in Wisconsin and 
Michigan sought to expand their own powers and curtail new Democratic governors from 
powers enjoyed by prior governors.62 While Wisconsin Democrats reportedly were 
concerned that the GOP leadership might try to tinker with redistricting rules,63 
redistricting rules change legislation did not emerge. 
 
The Michigan House passed a bill in late 2018 that makes it more difficult for people to 
advance voter initiatives.  That action came after voters had approved ballot questions that 
created a redistricting commission as well as automatic and election day voter 
registration.64  
 
New Jersey Democrats attempted to move on a constitutional amendment to change the 
state’s redistricting commission appointment process and rules. The proposed amendment 
would have required that new districts be drawn to favor a political party if the party won 
a higher percentage of votes in recent presidential, governor and U.S. Senate elections as 
well as change the commission membership selection process, reducing the number of 
commission members who would be appointed by the two major party state chairs. 
Instead, state legislative leaders would get the majority of appointments.65 After public 
criticism, the effort was pulled from consideration. 66 
 
B. Roles in Litigation 
 
In most states, attorneys general have the power to defend state laws in court. Generally, 
attorneys general also defend against redistricting plan challenges (unless state law 
permits and one or more legislative leaders are named parties to the challenge). 
 
In 2019, in Virginia	House	of	Delegates	v.	Bethune‐Hill, the Supreme Court held that the 
Virginia House of Delegates lacked standing to challenge a remedial redistricting plan 
 
62 See Russell Berman, “The Republicans’ Midwest ‘Power Grab,’” The Atlantic (December 4, 2018), available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/gop-power-grab-wisconsin-and-michigan/577246/ 
63 See Todd Richmond, “Wisconsin Democrats fear GOP redistricting end-around,” AP (November 28, 2018), available at 
https://apnews.com/2f28ee1f0c5249e3bbf3515f58c8b299 
64 See Ari Berman, “After Voters Passed Progressive Ballot Initiatives, GOP Legislatures Are Trying to Kill Future Ones,” 
Mother Jones (December 20, 2018), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/12/after-voters-passed-
progressive-ballot-initiatives-gop-legislatures-are-trying-to-kill-future-ones/ 
65 See Joseph De Avila, “New Jersey Democratic Leaders Split on Redistricting,” Wall Street Journal (November 26, 2018), 
available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-jersey-democratic-leaders-split-on-redistricting-1543276211 
66 See Joseph De Avila, ”New Jersey Democratic Leaders Pull Redistricting Bill After Criticism,” Wall Street Journal 




developed by a lower federal court67 Experts explain, “The Court found that the House 
lacked standing because Virginia had not designated that chamber to represent the state’s 
interests, and the House could not appeal in its own right.”68 The Court pointed out that 
Virginia law gives the authority for representing the state in civil litigation to the state 
attorney general.69  The Court’s ruling in Board	of	Elections	v.	Bethune	Hill may have wide 
ranging implications for legislative leaders in future litigation.  
 
C. Transparency and Discovery 
 
Fairness and transparency in redistricting not can only help avert litigation, but also 
provide a stronger record on which to defend a plan.  Conversely, line drawing practices 
that overreach may later be subject of discovery if the plan is challenged in court.  While 
courts have accorded state legislators (and by extension their staff) with limited privileges 
and immunities regarding their legislative work70, in redistricting cases, assertions of such 
privileges are not always successful in averting discovery.71 
 
VII. Outlook and Recommendations 
 
A. Post-2020 Census Outlook 
 
As the 2021 redistricting round approaches, states still have time to develop and adopt 
new standards and procedures for redistricting, often without amending state 
constitutions. 
 
Legislators and voters may attempt to create either advisory or independent commissions. 
As referenced above, in 2015 alone five states created redistricting commissions; in 2014 
New York voters approved a new advisory commission and during the 2019 session, the 
Virginia General Assembly provided initial approval for a new commission.  
 
Nonetheless, most post-2020 Census redistricting will be completed by state legislatures. 
Especially if they want to retain redistricting responsibility, legislators from both parties 
should begin working together to avoid highly partisan legislative debates and the costly 
litigation that results from overreach and unfair procedures.  
 
B. Procedural Recommendations 
 
Below is a checklist of procedural steps that states and other redistricting authorities 
should consider taking for the post-2020 Census redistricting. 
 
67 Va.	House	of	Delegates	v.	Bethune‐Hill, 587 U.S. __ (2019), 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) 
68 “Redistricting Law 2020,” National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note [] at 47 (2019) 
69 Va. House of Delegates, supra, at1952 (“Authority and responsibility for representing the State’s interests in civil 
litigation, Virginia law prescribes, rest exclusively with the State’s Attorney General”) 
70 For background on legislative privileges, see National Conference of State Legislatures, “Legislative Privilege & 





Election district transparency:  
 
Create a statewide web-based resource for election district, county district, and municipal 
ward boundary data along with a single file, table or database containing demographic 
data, election results at the election districts level, in a manner that matches the election 
districts boundary data.  This would provide the public with electoral district boundary 
information, demographic and population data included in the Census Bureau’s 
redistricting data files and election data. 
 
Prioritized criteria:  
 
One of the best ways to achieve a fair and legally justifiable redistricting effort is to use 
prioritized and ranked criteria. The federal standards mandating equal population and 
compliance with the federal voting rights act should always be prioritized first.  Important, 
but secondary standards are compactness, contiguity, minimizing splits at the county, city, 
town and village level, keeping communities of interest intact, and minimizing matchups by 
two or more incumbents. While there is no “one size fits all” sequence, it is important that 
criteria be met and not violated unless a more highly ranked criterion conflicts with it. 
 
Convenient statewide hearings to permit the public to provide meaningful comment 
throughout the process:   
 
The first round of hearings should consider how existing districts compare to new 
population data after the census data is provided to the states (a “malapportionment” 
review) and whether the existing districts must be altered to meet “one person, one vote” 
population equality standards. A second round of hearings should be held to solicit public 
comment after an initial draft plan is developed by the redistricting authority. A final round 
of hearings should consider public comment after changes to the first draft map are made. 
 
Accessible websites to provide as much information to the public as possible:  
 
Information on accessible websites should include: 1) complete maps of existing, proposed 
and final maps accompanied with population and racial data as reported to the states by 
the Census Bureau and 2) complete election results for the districts over the last ten years. 
Computer shape files also should be posted to enable redistricting software users to 
replicate the maps on offsite computers. 
  
Transparent process:  
 
All meetings should be open to the public. The California Citizens Redistricting Commission 
website could serve as a model for transparency.  All maps, data, hearing transcripts, 
agendas, memoranda, correspondence, litigation documents and other materials are 
available for public review.72  
 
72 available at https://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/ 
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C. Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
Whether states redistrict by legislature or commission, unless new legislative maps are 
drawn in a more fair, transparent and participatory process, the courts may find 
themselves dealing with as many challenges as they have in the last decade. Federal and 
state courts will continue to hear challenges dealing with equal population, statutory 
violations and racial gerrymandering. While federal courts may no longer hear cases 
alleging partisan gerrymanders, state constitutions may provide an opening for state 
challenges to partisan gerrymanders. 
 
By the end of 2019, seven states were still in court fighting over post-2010 redistricting 
plans, most of which were first redrawn several years earlier.73 A myriad  of cases 
challenging how the 2020 census will be taken are also being considered by federal 
courts.74 
 
Unless legislators and commissions learn from the myriad number of cases in the last 
decade dealing with plans that violated equal protection standards, minority voting rights 
and fair redistricting for all voters, the same mistakes that happened in the last 10 years 
are bound to repeat themselves. But if redistricters are more inclusive, open and 
communicative with people who are from varying partisan and voting rights perspectives 
and follow the rule of law without being secretive or manipulative, litigation will be  






Model Criteria for An Independent Redistricting Commission 
 
 
1.(a) The commission shall develop and approve a plan for dividing the legislative body 
into legislative districts for the election of legislators that complies with applicable law and 
provisions of this charter as follows: 
 
(b) All districts shall be as nearly equal in population as is practical except as necessary to 
satisfy the requirements of subdivisions c, e and f of this section, but the difference in 
population between the most and least populous district shall not exceed ten percent of the 
mean population of all districts,  
 
 
73 See Brennan Center, ”The State of Redistricting,” available at https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/state-redistricting-
litigation 





(c) Each district shall consist of contiguous territory; no district shall consist of parts 
entirely separated by the territory of another district of the same body, whether such 
territory be land or water, populated  or unpopulated. A populated census block shall not 
be divided by a district boundary, unless it can be determined that the populated part of 
such block is within a single district. 
 
(d) The whole number of persons reported in the federal decennial census shall be the 
basis for determining district populations except that no person shall be deemed to have 
gained or lost a residence by reason of conviction and incarceration in a federal or state 
correctional facility. 
  
(e) No district shall  be established that results in a denial to members of racial and 
linguistic minority  groups ( as recognized by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (as 
amended)) of an equal opportunity with other citizens to participate in the political process 
and to elect the representatives of their choice. The principles stated in subdivision [f?] of 
this section shall be used to create districts  that will afford fair representation to the 
members of those racial and linguistic minority groups  who are  sufficiently  numerous  
and whose residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they 
will  be  able  to  elect  representatives of their choice. 
 
(f) Subject and subsidiary to the requirements of subdivisions a, b, c, d and e of this section, 
the following principles shall be followed in the creation districts. A principle with a lower 
number shall have precedence over a principle with a higher number. 
 
 (1) Cities shall not be divided in the formation of districts; 
 
(2) To the extent possible, towns shall not be divided in the formation of districts,   
 
(3) Where possible, village subdivisions shall not be divided in the formation of districts 
 
(4) If a town must be divided, where possible, incorporated villages shall not be divided. 
 
(5) Districts shall be as compact in form as possible. Districts shall be compared, using 
average numerical measures, for (a) geographic dispersion, the degree to which the 
territory of districts is either tightly packed or widely spread out; (b) the relation of the 
perimeter lengths to the areas of districts; and (c) the dispersion of the populations of 
districts;  
 
(6) To the extent possible, a district shall unite communities defined by actual shared 
interests, taking account of geographic, social, economic, and other factors  that indicate 
commonality of interest, and districts shall be formed so as to promote the orderly and 
efficient administration of elections. 
 
(7)  To the extent possible, the residences of two or more incumbent legislators shall not be 
placed in the same district. 
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